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What message do voters send by removing a judgefrom office based on disagreement with a lawfuljudicial decision? That question is at the heart of
this issue of the American Judges Association’s Court Review,
which focuses on the issue in light of the 2018 recall of Cali-
fornia Judge Aaron Persky based on public outrage at the law-
ful, but extremely lenient, sentence he gave to a Stanford Uni-
versity student-athlete in a highly publicized sexual assault
case. The message to other judges: Impose harsher sentences?
Or perhaps a more specific message: Take sexual assault cases
seriously? Viewed broadly, is this an example of the voters
demanding accountability in sentencing, or of voters sending a
more insidious message—Rule in a way that is not in step with
the prevailing public opinion and risk your position as a judge?
Despite the valid concerns caused by the Stanford case, it is
this latter message that, in my view, presents the greatest threat
to judicial independence. 
In 2010, those who opposed same-sex marriage in Iowa sent
precisely this dangerous message. An aptly named TV ad,
“Send Them a Message,” urged Iowa voters to “vote NO” on
the retention of three respected Iowa Supreme Court justices,
characterizing them as “activist judges” who “ignor[e] the will
of voters,” “legislat[e] from the bench,” and “usurp the will of
voters.”1 The ad was part of a larger, politically motivated cam-
paign to oust the three justices who were on the ballot for
merit retention. To be clear, the outrage was not based on the
justices’ ethics, professionalism, jurisprudence, or judicial
integrity. Rather, the effort to remove these justices focused on
one particular, unanimous decision striking down, as uncon-
stitutional, Iowa’s ban on same-sex marriage. The message: Do
not ignore the will of the voters.
But this message is the antithesis of the role of the judiciary
in our democracy. Judges should decide cases based on the
facts and the law, not the will of the voters. Our branch is not
intended to be political. Our judges are expected to be fair and
impartial—not swayed by popular opinion, or pressures from
special interests or the other two branches of government. Per-
haps Justice Sandra Day O’Connor put it best: “The Founders
realized that there has to be someplace where being right is
more important than being popular or powerful, and where
fairness trumps strength. And in our country that place is sup-
posed to be the courtroom.”2
Yet, in 2012, inspired by the success of that 2010 campaign
in Iowa, special interest groups3 targeted my colleagues, Jus-
tices Peggy Quince and R. Fred Lewis, and me when we were
on Florida’s ballot for merit retention in 2012. As I have
detailed in several articles,4 our opponents used some of the
same political messages employed in Iowa—especially that
catch-all, ill-defined term: “activist judges.” They used selected
opinions from our Court that, although jurisprudentially
sound, could be reduced to potentially controversial sound
bites. Their true goal: oust us to give the governor his chance
to select three new justices who presumably would be more in
line with his judicial philosophy.5 The attacks required my col-
leagues and me to travel the state to speak to Florida voters
and editorial boards, attempting to explain that the campaign
against us was not based on our integrity, professionalism, or
competence.
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groups” on the judiciary. Obviously, groups advocating for a par-
ticular view are important to the function of our government and
are not inherently negative. For example, “special interest
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cal, messages or influence that have no place in the judiciary,
which was designed to be free from politics.
Finally, this article addresses the threat that arises when state
legislatures react to judicial decisions in ways that may under-
mine judicial independence.
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race-unusually-stressful-costly-this-election/vpfPqHdF5L
XfDydMuf9uKP/.
So, how do we strike the appropriate balance between judi-
cial accountability and maintaining a fair and impartial judi-
ciary? This article attempts to answer that question by explain-
ing why state courts are more vulnerable to attack than federal
courts, defining proper characteristics for voters to consider in
reviewing judges on the ballot for election or merit retention,
and suggesting ways to ensure that judges and justices are less
vulnerable to be removed or influenced by vocal public opin-
ions or by special interests. Recent history has shown that,
despite the good intentions of adopting a less political method
of appointing and retaining judges and justices through a merit-
based system, more needs to be done to further insulate state
court judges from improper removal, or even influence, based
on disagreement with specific judicial decisions. 
WHY STATE COURTS ARE MORE VULNERABLE TO
ATTACK THAN FEDERAL
Whether state or federal, elected or appointed, judges per-
form a function fundamentally different from that of the peo-
ple’s elected representatives in the other two branches of gov-
ernment.6 Legislative and executive officials are expected to
consider public opinion, special interests who lobby, their
political party agendas, or even their own personal opinions
about issues.  But judges are expected to act to protect the
rights guaranteed in the Constitution and to enforce the rule of
law so that all who come before court are treated equally and
without “fear or favor.” Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court
have warned of the corrosive effect of treating judges like
politicians. For example, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg put it:
“[N]othing less than democracy itself is at stake if partisan
groups are allowed to throw . . . justices off [their states’]
high court[s].”7 The reason for the threat is clear: even if ulti-
mately unsuccessful, attacks against the judiciary present the
real danger that the judge will fear removal if the public dis-
agrees with a decision.8
To guard against this threat, our Founders provided the fun-
damental tenet in our Constitution that federal judges be
appointed to “lifetime tenure with removal only for high
crimes and misdemeanors.”9 This system effectively prevents
the specter of removal for issuing an unpopular opinion with
which the public, politicians, or special interests disagree.10
The federal system of lifetime appointment also creates a clear
distinction between the judiciary and the other two political
branches of government. 
For example, although U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl
Warren was under attack for the
Court’s then-unpopular 1954
unanimous opinion in Brown v.
Board of Education,11 which he
authored, he was not in danger of
removal. Despite billboards in the
South that read “Impeach Earl
Warren,”12 which appeared imme-
diately after the Court issued its
decision in Brown, Chief Justice
Warren’s judicial position was
never in jeopardy. Because of the
constitutional protection designed
wisely by our Founders, the public’s disagreement with the
opinion could never constitute grounds to remove Chief Justice
Warren or any other member of that Court. This enabled the
Justices to decide the case based on the Constitution, not based
on which side enjoyed greater public support.  
Of course, even the federal model of lifetime appointment
does not immunize federal judges from personal attacks.
Throughout history, but intensifying more recently, various
groups, such as the media, lobbyists, and politicians—includ-
ing, even at times, the President of the United States—have
attacked federal judges for decisions with which they disagree
and, on occasion, have specifically attacked not just the deci-
sion but the decision maker. As the President of the American
Bar Association (ABA) recently explained:
Disagreeing with a court’s decision is everyone’s right,
but when government officials question a court’s
motives, mock its legitimacy or threaten retaliation due
to an unfavorable ruling, they intend to erode the court’s
standing and hinder the courts from performing their
constitutional duties.13
After U.S. President Donald Trump referred to a federal
judge as “an Obama Judge,” criticizing an adverse ruling and
the judge himself, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John
Roberts publicly “defended the independence and integrity of
the federal judiciary,” stating:
We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush
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Selection, NAT’L CTR. ST. COURTS, http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state= (last
visited Aug. 24, 2018). Only Rhode Island has adopted the federal
model of lifetime appointment. A few other states have adopted
systems in which judges are appointed for one long term. Meth-
ods of Judicial Selection.
16. Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 15.
17. See id. (explaining that districts in Kansas are split on the selec-
tion of district judges; seventeen districts use gubernatorial
appointment from nominating commission while fourteen dis-
tricts use partisan election).
18. A New Era for Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 4, at 1543-
44.
19. Id. at 1543.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See New Resources for Evaluating Judicial Candidates, Informed
Voters: Fair Judges (Aug. 16, 2018), https://ivp.nawj.org/
2018/08/16/new-resources-for-evaluating-judicial-candidates/
(“Many voters do not know what to look for in selecting judges
or why they are on the ballot.”).
23. Wallace Jefferson & Barbara J. Pariente, The “Citizens United”
Anniversary Is a Regrettable Date for State Courts, VOIR DIRE 14
(Spring 2015).
24. ALICIA BANNON, CHOOSING STATE JUDGES: A PLAN FOR REFORM 10
(2018); see Jefferson & Pariente, supra note 23, at 14.
25. See Reddick & Kourlis, supra note 15, at 9; Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
The Ideal of Judicial Independence: Complications and Challenges,
47 TULSA L. REV. 141, 154 (2011). Other common criticism of
merit selection includes “that it puts elites in control of selecting
judges,” and “nominating commissions operate in secret with no
public accountability.” Reddick & Kourlis, supra note 15, at 8.
26. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
27. Wallace & Pariente, supra note 23, at 14.
28. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 8, at 55 (explaining why public
accountability, at some level, is important).
judges or Clinton judges[.] . . .
What we have is an extraordinary
group of dedicated judges doing
their level best to do equal right
to those appearing before them.
That independent judiciary is
something we should all be
thankful for.14
Unlike the federal system, virtu-
ally all state judiciaries—whether
selected by contested elections, gubernatorial appointment,
legislative selection, or commission-based gubernatorial
appointment—do not enjoy the protections enshrined in our
federal constitution.15 Instead, jurisdictions across the country
use various processes because the method of judicial selection,
as well as terms of service, are controlled by each state’s own
constitution.16 Sometimes, different jurisdictions within the
same state even use different processes.17
Many states adopted merit-based systems for judicial selec-
tion and retention in an effort to insulate state-court judges as
much as possible from the politics seen in elections in the
other two branches.18 Under the merit-based system, judges
are appointed by the state’s governor after review by a com-
mission based on their qualifications, which “typically
include a candidate’s legal ability, integrity and impartiality,
professionalism and temperament, and any other necessary
skills for the level or jurisdiction of the court to which the
candidate is applying.”19 Then, periodically throughout their
term depending on the state’s constitution, the judge appears
on the ballot.20 Voters vote yes or no as to whether the judge
should retain his or her seat and “does not face a chal-
lenger.”21
Unfortunately, history has shown that even merit-based sys-
tems are not immune from attack. Since 2010, special interest
groups have increasingly interfered in retention elections, a
topic on which voters are often under-educated,22 by mischar-
acterizing judges and their decisions. “[S]pecial interest groups
seek to remove good judges whose only offense is having ruled
according to the law, rather than the special interest groups’
agenda.”23 In fact, the most recent report from the Brennan
Center for Justice explains that merit-based systems have
become more political in recent years, to the point that any
intended decrease in political influence by adopting the merit-
based system may be lost.24 Some argue that merit-based sys-
tems are more political than elections.25 Even more concerning,
some of these efforts by special interest groups to oust well-
qualified jurists, as in Iowa, have been successful.
Some, myself included, attribute the rise of these politically
motivated attacks against the judiciary on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s January 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission.26 As Wallace Jefferson, former Chief Justice of
the Texas Supreme Court, and I explained in 2015, Citizens
United and other decisions “led to unrestricted spending from
outside groups” on elections in all three branches of govern-
ment.27
Accountability for the conduct of judges, like all public offi-
cials, is, of course, critical to a well-functioning democracy.
However, a threat arises when the “accountability” is based on
one-sided attacks or mere disagreement with an isolated deci-
sion.28 And, “accountability” in the form of voters at the ballot
box choosing to remove the judge poses a great danger to judi-
cial independence. Ironically, Professor Margaret Lemos, pro-
fessor and Senior Associate Dean for Faculty and Research at
Duke Law, explains that, at least in the abstract, the public
actually disfavors politicization of the courts:
Studies of state court systems . . . suggest that the
more political the judicial-selection system, the lower
the public’s sense of the legitimacy of the courts. Public
confidence in the courts tends to be lower in states with
partisan judicial elections than in other kinds of selec-
tion systems. When the public hears about judges
accepting campaign contributions or being subjected to
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GALLUP (Nov. 1, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-
matters/221171/americans-perceive-government-2017.aspx
(“Americans have a relatively higher level of trust in the judicial
branch than either the executive or legislative branch.”).
30. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 804 (2002)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Justice Free from Special Interests,
Informed Voters: Fair Judges, https://ivp.nawj.org/app/uploads/
2016/06/Politics-and-special-interests.pdf (“Unlike our represen-
tatives in the legislature, we depend on our judges to stand apart
from politics and partisan ideas.”).
31. See Statement of Bob Carlson, ABA President Re: Being Thankful for
Judicial Independence, AM. BAR ASS’N (Nov. 27, 2018),
https: / /www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-
archives/2018/11/statement-of-bob-carlson--aba-president-re--
being-thankful-for-j/ (The ABA “is committed to an independent,
impartial judiciary that is free from political influence.”).
32. The Mission of the American Judicature Society is “to secure and
promote an independent and qualified judiciary and a fair system
of justice.” AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://americanjudicaturesoci-
ety.org/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
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1537-38; see Randall T. Shepard, Judicial Independence and the
Problem of Elections: “We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us,” 20
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Raises Possibility of Impeaching Justices, BRENNAN CTR. JUST.: FAIR
CTS. E-LERT (Aug. 24, 2018); see also also Greytak, et al.,
Bankrolling the Bench: The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2013-
14, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. 3 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/publications/The_New_Politics_of_Judicial_Ele
ction_2013_2014.pdf.
35. For example, as the recent impeachment of four West Virginia
Supreme Court justices for improper use of state funds reminds us,
judges are accountable to the public in their positions as govern-
mental actors. West Virginia House Votes to Impeach Four West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court Justices; Senate Schedules Trial, BRENNAN CTR.
JUST.: FAIR CTS. E-LERT (Aug. 24, 2018). Yet, some have posited
that the alleged improper use of funds was a smokescreen for a
political agenda by the other branches. See Meagan Flynn, West
Virginia Botches Impeachment of Chief Justice. Faces Constitutional
Crisis. Stay Tuned., WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2018),
https : / /www.washingtonpost .com/news/morning-mix/
wp/2018/10/15/west-virginia-botches-impeachment-of-chief-
justice-faces-constitutional-crisis-stay-tuned/?utm_term=
.a2e7c64c75a2.
36. See generally, e.g., Code of Judicial Conduct for the State of
Florida, Fla. Supreme Ct., http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/
decisions/ethics/canon7.shtml (last updated June 18, 2015); Code
of Judicial Conduct, N.J. Courts (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/rules/cjc.pdf; Oregon Code
of Judicial Conduct, Or. Cts. (2013), https://www.courts.
oregon.gov/rules/Other%20Rules/CodeJudicialConduct.pdf.
or using attack ads, public support for and confidence in
the courts diminishes.29
While principled criticism of judicial decisions is part of a
functioning democracy, the threat of removal is antithetical to
the Framers’ core principle of an independent and non-politi-
cal judicial branch of government.30 Jurists should not perceive
a potential threat to their position if they rule in a way that is
unpopular, or out of step with public opinion, special interests,
or the other political branches. 
Ultimately, the question is whether there is ever an appro-
priate reason for voters to remove a judge because of disagree-
ment with a judicial decision. My response is a resounding
“no.” Removal on these grounds presents the real risk of mak-
ing judges accountable to the voters, those in power, and those
whose interests are threatened by judicial decisions. Such
“accountability” undermines judicial legitimacy, threatens
judicial independence, and upends the essential role of the
judiciary—to protect each person’s (whether individual or cor-
porate) constitutional rights, which may, at times, prove
counter to the majority view, special interests, or the other two
branches of government. 
So, what are the proper considerations to ensure a balance
between accountability and judicial independence? The next sec-
tion explains these five proper considerations for evaluating
judges or judicial candidates: (1) integrity, (2) professional com-
petence, (3)judicial temperament, (4)experience, and (5)service.
ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY: PROPER 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Despite the attention of several prestigious groups of
lawyers—including the American
Bar Association (ABA),31 the Amer-
ican Judicature Society,32 and the
American College of Trial
Lawyers33—the threat of improper
influence on our state judiciary
remains a serious problem that
threatens the essence of a fair and
impartial judiciary.34 Because
attacks against the judiciary con-
tinue, it is important to determine
the proper factors that should be considered in electing, retain-
ing, or even impeaching or recalling judges—whether by vot-
ers, the executive, or the legislature. Strong arguments sup-
porting judicial accountability exist, especially when the
breaches arise from actual judicial misconduct.35
But judicial accountability should not come at the expense
of judicial independence or fairness. In fact, there are already
several forms of accountability in place that appropriately
strike this balance. First, there is an important check on judi-
cial behavior in that all judges are required to follow their
state’s Code of Judicial Conduct.36 With respect to misconduct,
that accountability is properly monitored by strong judicial
qualifications commissions. 
Accountability also derives from the basic requirement that
trial judges adhere to precedent and follow the rules of evi-
dence, and their decisions are subject to review by a higher
court. As the Supreme Court of Washington has explained:
Judicial independence does not equate to unbridled
discretion to bully and threaten, to disregard the require-
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37. In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 936 (Wash. 1999).
38. About the Informed Voters Project, Informed Voters Project: Fair
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39. Evaluation Tips, Informed Voters Project: Fair Judges 1,
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Performance Evaluation Comm’n, https://www.nmjpec.org/en/
how-we-evaluate/overall-factors (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
40. The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan, Inst. Advancement Am.
Legal Sys. 2-3 (June 2014), http://iaals.du.edu/projects/oconnor-
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41. Evaluation Tips, supra note 39.
42. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Am. Bar Ass’n (2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct/.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976);
State v. Hess, 785 N.W.2d 568, 584 (Wis. 2010).
44. See DRI, supra note 39, at 34 (“The system should select judges
who will be accountable to the laws and the constitutions of the
United States and the applicable state.”).
45. Bannon, supra note 24, at 1.
46. Id.
47. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1674 (2015) (Gins-
burg, J., concurring in part).
48. Reddick & Kourlis, supra note 15, at 12.
49. See Berry, supra note 8, at 1.
50. Chris Perez, Judge Uses Racial Slur to Describe Defendant, Blames
New York Upbringing, N.Y. POST (May 21, 2018),
https://nypost.com/2018/05/21/judge-uses-racial-slur-to-
describe-defendant-blames-new-york-upbringing/. “The slur is a
shortened version of ‘mulignan’—a Sicilian slur used to describe
black people or somebody with a dark complexion, according to
the commission’s report on the case.” David Ovalle, Miami Judge
Who Used an Obscure Racial Slur Resigns from the Bench, MIAMI
HERALD (July 13, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/
local/article214845940.html.
ments of the law, or to ignore the
constitutional rights of defen-
dants. . . . Judicial independence
requires a judge to commit to
following the constitution, the
statutes, common law principles,
and precedent without intrusion
from or intruding upon other
branches of government. It does
not refer to independence from
judicial disciplinary bodies (or
from higher courts). Decision making is constrained by
the evidence, by appropriate procedural rules, records and
legal principles.37
In an attempt to advance the goal of a fair and impartial
judiciary, the National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ)
launched its Informed Voters Project (IVP), “a non-partisan
voter education initiative developed to increase public aware-
ness about the judicial system, to inform voters that politics
and special interest attacks have no place in the courts, and to
give voters the tools they need to ensure judges are appointed
and elected on the basis of their character and ability.”38 IVP
offers the following five factors as proper considerations in
evaluating judicial candidates for selection and retention—(1)
integrity, (2) professional competence, (3) judicial tempera-
ment, (4) experience, and (5) service—which frame the dis-
cussion below.39 Similarly, former U.S. Supreme Court’s Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor’s The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan,
sets forth the following “values desired in individual judges”:
fairness and impartiality, competence, judicial philosophy, pro-
ductivity and efficiency, clarity, demeanor and temperament,
community, and separation of politics from adjudication.40
1. INTEGRITY
First, IVP explains that judges should be of the highest
integrity: “[a] judge should be honest, impartial, and commit-
ted to the rule of law.”41 Likewise, Canon 1 of the ABA’s Model
Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges “shall uphold and
promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary.”42 Given that each state’s code of judicial conduct
and the federal and state constitutions are the lynchpins to
judicial service,43 violating these obligations would properly
subject a judge or justice to consequence, including removal.44
As the Brennan Center explains, “A judge’s job is to apply
the law fairly and to protect our rights, even when doing so is
unpopular or angers the wealthy and powerful.”45 Therefore,
as discussed above, “the reality of competing in costly, highly
politicized elections is at odds with this role.”46 Justice Gins-
burg, joined by Justice Breyer, addressed this in 2015 in her
concurring in part opinion in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar:
“Favoritism,” i.e., partiality, if inevitable in the polit-
ical arena, is disqualifying in the judiciary’s domain. . . .
Unlike politicians, judges are not “expected to be respon-
sive to [the] concerns” of constituents. McCutcheon [v.
Fed. Election Comm’n,] 134 S. Ct. [1434,] 1441 [(2014)]
(plurality opinion). Instead, “it is the business of judges
to be indifferent to popularity.” Chisom v. Roemer, 501
U.S. 380, 401, n. 29, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 115 L. Ed. 2d 348
(1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).47
Of course, situations in which a judge should be removed
may not be so clear cut. As others have recognized, these
“characteristics . . . are . . . difficult to measure.”48 What if a
judge’s decisions reflect impermissible bias based on race, eth-
nicity, gender, sexual orientation, or other forms of bias?49
What if a judge uses a racial slur while performing his or her
official duties, or in public? For example, in 2018, Florida trial
judge was under review for “using the word ‘moolie’ to
describe a black defendant . . . while speaking with the
defendant’s lawyer in chambers about scheduling.”50 After
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attempting to justify the use of this word,51 “Millan agreed to
undergo racial sensitivity training,” but Florida’s Judicial Qual-
ifications Committee (JQC) recommended that Millan be sus-
pended from the bench for thirty days without pay, fined
$5,000, and subject to a public reprimand.52 The Florida JQC
wrote: “The use of racially derogatory and demeaning language
to describe litigants, criminal defendants or members of the
public, even behind closed doors or during off-the-record con-
versations, erodes public confidence in a fair and impartial
judiciary.”53 After the Supreme Court of Florida unanimously
rejected the JQC’s proposed sanctions and sent the case back
for a full hearing, Millan resigned from the bench.54
In a similar vein, Florida trial judge Mark Hulsey III was
charged by the Florida JQC for making racist and sexist com-
ments in court and “misus[ing] his judicial assistant and staff
attorneys.”55 “[F]acing potential impeachment by the Florida
Legislature and” discipline by the JQC, Hulsey resigned.56 As
the cases of Millan and Hulsey show, the proper response to
improper judicial actions by overt acts of bias does not seem to
be removal by the voters but, rather, a more vigorous use of the
JQC or appropriate disciplinary body. The message this time:
Explicit prejudice will not be tolerated in the courts.
2. PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE
Second, as to “professional competence,” IVP explains that
“[a] judge should have a keen intellect, extensive legal knowl-
edge and strong writing skills.”57 Professional competence
matters in both judicial selection—for determining whether a
candidate is qualified for the role based on the state’s specific
qualifications—and judicial retention. Fortunately, judicial
competence has rarely been challenged in judicial retention
elections. 
3. JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT
Third, as to “judicial temperament,” IVP explains that “[a]
judge must be neutral, decisive, respectful and composed.”58
Similarly, The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan explains that
judges must be “patient and even-keeled” as well as “collegial
and humble,” meanwhile “command[ing] respect from the
community and from those who enter the courthouse,” which
the judge should “work to make . . . a comfortable place.”59
Canon 2 of the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct pro-
vides: “A judge shall perform the
duties of judicial office impar-
tially, competently, and dili-
gently.”60
An example of accountability
on this front comes from Ari-
zona, where voters in 2014,
recalled a judge for the first time
since 1978.61 Judge Benjamin
Norris of Maricopa County
Superior Court was presiding
over a custody case when the fol-
lowing ensued:
The mother’s attorney was trying to convince Norris
that the father should not have unlimited access to his
two daughters, but Norris had quashed the subpoena of
the Child Protective Services caseworkers who were sup-
posed to testify.
Then, when the mother’s attorney asked if Norris had
watched a video of an earlier hearing in which a judge
had imposed a protective order against the father, Norris
flew into a rage.
“I work 12-hour days,” he said. “And if you start mak-
ing me watch two hours of video for every hour hearing,
I don’t have 36 hours in a day.”
“Why are you yelling at me?” the lawyer asked.
“Because I’m upset by this.”62
The hearing continued. “Nothing was accomplished.”63
Norris’s “lack of civility,” which other judges had also noticed,
“resulted in a bad review of his performance as a judge” by the
Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review.64 In
response to the Commission’s review, the Maricopa County
electorate rejected Norris’s retention,65 sending this message:
Judges will be required to maintain a certain level of civility and
patience in performing their judicial duties. “[M]any in the legal
community” considered Norris’s loss “a validation for the judi-
cial-retention ballot.”66
In contrast to the message voters send when they merely
disagree with a judicial decision, the message sent to Judge
Norris was properly based on his actions in performing his role
51. Perez, supra note 50.
52. Id.; accord eds., Racial Bias in the Courtroom Undercuts Justice,
MIAMI HERALD (July 15, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/
opinion/editorials/article214917125.html.
53. Perez, supra note 50.
54. Order, Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No.17-570, No. SC18-775
(Fla. June 8, 2018); Ovalle, supra note 50.
55. Larry Hannan, Jacksonville Judge Accused of Racist and Sexist Com-
ments Resigns, Jacksonville.com (Jan. 23, 2017).
56. Id.
57. Evaluation Tips, supra note 39; see In re Barnes, 510 N.E.2d 392,
398 (Ct. App. Ohio 1986); Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note
15.
58. Evaluation Tips, supra note 39.
59. O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan, supra note 40, at 3.
60. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 42.
61. Michael Kiefer, Merit Proponents: Voting Out Judge Out Shoes Sys-
tem Works, AZCentral (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.azcentral.com/
story/news/arizona/politics/2014/11/07/merit-proponents-voting-
judge-shows-system-works/18654583/.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. After conducting surveys, asking for self-evaluations, and
holding interviews with judges, “the commissioners tallied up the
data as to Norris’ qualifications to remain on the bench” and
“rated him at the bottom.” Id. The commission voted 23-3 that
Judge Norris “did not meet adequate standards.” Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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67. Another example of a judge’s proper removal for improper conduct
that affected the judge’s official role was seen recently with the sus-
pension of Michigan County Judge Theresa Brennan. See Oralan-
dar Brand-Williams, State Panel: Stop Paying Livingston County
Judge Brennan, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.detroit-
news.com/story/news/2019/01/16/state-panel-stop-paying-liv-
ingston-county-judge-brennan/2593509002/.
68. Marc Freeman, High Court Removes Palm Beach County Judge Over
Campaign Misconduct, S. FLA. SUNSENTINEL (July 2, 2018),
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/palm-beach/fl-pn-judge-
santino-supreme-court-ruling-20180702-story.html.
69. Id.
70. Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 16-534 RE: Dana Marie Santino,
43 FLA. L. WEEKLY S477, 2018 WL 5095128, *10 (Fla. Oct. 19, 2018).
71. “Experience” is defined as the “[a]ctive participation in events or
activities, leading to the accumulation of knowledge or skill.” Expe-
rience, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY ENG. LANGUAGE,
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=experience
(last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
72. Evaluation Tips, supra note 39.
73. O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan, supra note 40, at 2.
74. “Service” is defined as “[e]mployment in duties or work for
another, as for a government.” service, Am. Heritage Dictionary
Eng. Language, https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?
q=service (last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
75. Evaluation Tips, supra note 39.
76. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 42.
77. See, e.g., Colman McCarthy, Injustice Claims a Tennessee Justice,
WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 1996), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/lifestyle/1996/11/26/injustice-claims-a-tennessee-
judge/f0a28c33-fcb1-4c1b-9471-2d5704d56a88/?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.fca53f190689 (explaining the removal of Justice
Penny White in Tennessee in 1996); Georgiana Vines, Where Are
They Now: Election Loss Led to Success in Academia for Former TN
Justice Penny White, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Sep. 6, 2014),
http://archive.knoxnews.com/entertainment/life/where-are-they-
now-election-loss-led-to-success-in-academia-for-former-tn-jus-
tice-penny-white-ep-596-354313321.html (same).
78. A New Era for Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 4, at 1529;
see A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/
04/us/politics/04judges.html.
79. See Bannon, supra note 24, at 10; see also Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); 
as a judge.67 Judges acting in the
manner that Judge Norris acted
threatens judicial legitimacy;
whereas, the exact opposite is true of
removing judges based on their rea-
soned decisions.
Judicial temperament may also be
compromised when judges are forced
to participate in contested elections.
Just this year, the Florida Supreme
Court removed a state trial judge for
2016 campaign violations.68 While
running against criminal defense
attorney Gregg Lerman, Dana Marie Santino’s campaign cre-
ated “a Facebook page that blasted opponent Lerman’s defense
of ‘Palm Beach County’s worst criminals’ and listed a few of his
higher-profile cases. The page showed a photo of Lerman sur-
rounded by the words ‘child pornography,’ ‘murder,’ ‘rape’ and
more, in boldface and all capital letters.”69 In its opinion
removing Santino from the bench, the Florida Supreme Court
wrote that “Santino’s conduct does not evidence a present fit-
ness to hold judicial office.”70 Again, the message seems proper
and reflects the principles espoused in nationwide judicial
codes of conduct: Judges will be required to maintain a certain
level of character and dignity in all actions.
4. EXPERIENCE
Fourth, as to “experience,”71 IVP explains that “[a] judge
should have a strong record of professional excellence in the
law.”72 The rationale underlying this factor often seems instinc-
tual: a judge should be an experienced advocate rather than a
brand-new attorney who has not gained sufficient experience to
perform judicial duties. The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan
suggests that this competence requirement demands judges
have the best academic and intellectual skills, stating that
judges must “have excellent analytical ability,” “demonstrate
excellent substantive legal knowledge, or a willingness to learn
at the earliest opportunity,” and “undertake the research neces-
sary to gain command of the facts and issues presented.”73
Of course, this factor is likely more important when consid-
ering a candidate for selection rather than retention because
judges up for retention already have experience on the bench,
so their ability to build on prior experiences to perform the
judicial role is obvious. However, even after selection, a judge
must be willing and able to continue expanding his or her
knowledge by learning and researching, as The O’Connor Judi-
cial Selection Plan explains.
5. SERVICE
Finally, as to “service,” 74 IVP explains that “[a] judge should
be committed to public service and the administration of jus-
tice.”75 A judge should be diligent and hardworking. The
judge’s motivation in fulfilling his or her duties should not be
for private gain, which would cause impropriety and improper
bias. Canon 3 of the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct
seems to contemplate this, providing: “A judge shall conduct
the judge’s personal and extrajudicial activities to minimize the
risk of conflict with the obligations of judicial office.”76
Having explained these proper considerations for judicial
selection and retention, or holding judges accountable, we turn
next to review other messages voters have sent to judges, which
were not based on these objective, neutral factors. Understand-
ing these attacks and what motivated them is essential to
understanding how to move forward; to make progress, we
must learn from the past.
IMPROPER CONSIDERATIONS USED TO ATTACK THE
JUDICIARY SINCE 2010
Politically motivated attacks on state-court judges existed
before 2010,77 but 2010 was a turning point.78 As mentioned
above, voters and, more specifically, special interest groups in
Iowa used a well-funded campaign to remove three highly qual-
ified Iowa Supreme Court justices on the ballot for merit reten-
tion.79 The impetus was the court’s unanimous opinion holding
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80. Sulzberger, supra note 78.
81. Id. Of course, we now know that the Iowa justices’ decision was
legally correct—as the U.S. Supreme Court held in 2016 in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
82. Sulzberger, supra note 78.
83. Alvarez, supra note 5; Musgrave, supra note 5. This was the first
time “a political party ever [took] a position” regarding the reten-
tion of state court judges. See Robert Barnes, Republicans Target
Three Florida Supreme Court Justices, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/republica
ns-target-three-florida-supreme-court-justices/2012/10/30/
edbeb5de-1d22-11e2-ba31-3083ca97c314_story.html?noredi-
rect=on&utm_term=.cd266c5be2f1. 
84. A New Era for Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 4, at 1549.
85. See generally Fla. Dep’t of State v. Mangat, 43 So. 3d 642 (Fla.
2010).
86. A New Era for Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 4, at 1549-
50 (quoting Preserving a Fair and Impartial Judiciary, supra note 2,
at 10); see Barnes, supra note 83.
87. See Musgrave, supra note 5.
88. TV Ad: Send Them a Message, supra note 1.
89. See Canon 7C(1), Code of Judicial Conduct for the State of
Florida, supra note 36; see also A New Era for Judicial Retention
Elections, supra note 4, at 1560 & n.203.
90. Musgrave, supra note 5.
91. Barnes, supra n. 83. 
92. Yet, we would see these buzzwords again just before our constitu-
tionally required retirement in January 2019. See, e.g., Gary
Rohrer, Florida Supreme Court: Next Governor Gets to Replace Retir-
ing Justices, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/politics/political-pulse/os-
ne-scott-appoint-justices-20181015-story.html; David Smiley,
Florida Supreme Court Ruling Raises Stakes of Governor’s Election,
MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/politics-government/state-politics/article220070010.html.
93. See TV Spending Surges Past $1.4 Million in Tennessee Judicial Race,
BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.brennan
center.org/press-release/tv-spending-surges-past-14-million-ten-
nessee-judicial-race (reporting “a national trend of increasing
expenditures on judicial elections,” especially in states that
“worked to insulate courts from political pressure by establishing
merit selection systems”). 
94. A New Era for Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 4, at 1556-
57; Mark Binker, Big Business Spends to Unseat NC Supreme 
Court Justice Hudson, WRAL.com (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://www.wral.com/big-business-spends-to-unseat-nc-
supreme-court-justice-hudson/13603252/.
95. Maggie Astor, California Voters Remove Judge Aaron Persky, Who
Gave a 6-Month Sentence for Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES (June 6,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us/politics/judge-
persky-brock-turner-recall.html.
96. Id.; accord Augie Martin, Holly Yan & Dan Merica, Voters Oust
Judge Who Gave Brock Turner 6 Months for Sex Assault, CNN (June
6, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/06/us/judge-aaron-
persky-recall-results-brock-turner/index.html.
unconstitutional a state statute banning same-sex marriage.
While those who mounted the campaign against these
“activist” justices—who were simply performing their judicial
duty of interpreting their state constitution—celebrated the
justices’ removal as “a popular rebuke of judicial overreach,”80
removing the justices had “no effect on” the substance of the
decision that caused the attack.81 Yet, those who led the cam-
paign commented that “the results should be a warning to
judges elsewhere.”82 The message: Unpopular decisions that
ignore the will of the people jeopardize your position on the bench. 
Just two years after the successful Iowa campaign, special
interest groups struck again. As mentioned above, opposition
groups—including Americans for Prosperity and the Tea Party
through Restore Justice, and ultimately the Republican Party of
Florida83—targeted my colleagues and me when we were up
for merit retention in the 2012 election,84 urging voters to vote
“no” on our retention. Initially, they focused on a decision
from our Court striking a state constitutional ballot initiative
that was marginally about the health care mandate in the
recently passed and very controversial Affordable Care Act.85
But our opponents soon turned to a 2004 decision in a capital-
sentencing case, which they used to support their argument to
voters that we used our “own views to usurp the law and sep-
aration of powers.”86 Focusing on these decisions, our oppo-
nents launched ads labeling us as activists, legislating from the
bench, and failing to respect victims of crime87—the same buzz
words that were used against the Iowa justices in the “Send
Them a Message” ad.88
As a result of these attacks, we each decided that we should
form a “Committee of Responsible Persons,” as authorized by
the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct,89 to fundraise and engage
in an educational campaign about
the purpose of merit retention. Con-
trary to the ads, we maintained that
our decisions were and would con-
tinue to be based solely on the law.90
In fact, “a study commissioned by
the Federalist Society found nothing
to support a charge of judicial
activism.”91 Unlike in Iowa, our
opponents were ultimately unsuc-
cessful and, fortunately, we were
each retained and able to continue in
our positions through our mandatory retirements.92 The mes-
sage still resonated, though: Despite the merit-retention system,
your seat is not safe from political attack.93
My concern, as seen in my own 2012 merit-retention elec-
tion, is that, by waging campaigns to remove a well-qualified
jurist, judges are forced to campaign against an undefined oppo-
nent—an even more difficult task than campaigning against a
defined opponent in an ordinary election. I am not alone in this
regard. As detailed in the law review article authored by attorney
Jim Robinson and me, political attacks on state court judiciaries
have continued—including in 2014 in Kansas and Tennessee,
and then again in Kansas in 201694—all fueled by groups
attempting to change the composition on the court under attack. 
Most recently, California voters expressed their discontent
with the judiciary in 2018 by recalling Judge Aaron Persky—
the first recall in the state in over eighty years.95 Voters
attacked Persky after he sentenced a Stanford athlete, Brock
Turner, “to just six months in jail for sexually assaulting an
unconscious woman.”96 Although Turner faced up to fourteen
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97. Christal Hayes & John Bacon, Judge Aaron Persky, Who Gave Brock
Turner Lenient Sentence in Rape Case, Recalled from Office, USA
TODAY (June 6, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
2018/06/06/judge-aaron-persky-who-gave-brock-turners-lenient-
sentence-sanford-rape-case-recalled/674551002/.
98. Christine Hauser, Brock Turner Loses Appeal to Overturn Sexual
Assault Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/08/09/us/brock-turner-appeal.html.
99. Astor, supra note 95.
100. Hauser, supra note 98.
101. Id.; see Hayes & Bacon, supra note 97.
102. John Pfaff, California Ousts an Elected Judge. Everybody Loses,
WASH. POST (June 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/posteverything/wp/2018/06/13/california-ousts-a-judge-
everybody-loses/?utm_term=.cd4158856239.
103. See Greytak, et al., supra note 34, at 3.
104. Berry, supra note 8, at 2.
105. A New Era for Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 4, at 1553.
106. Mark Binker, Big Business Spends to Unseat NC Supreme Court Jus-
tice Hudson, WRAL.com (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.wral.com/
big-business-spends-to-unseat-nc-supreme-court-justice-hud-
son/13603252/; see Jefferson & Pariente, supra note 23, at 14.
107. See Binker, supra note 106.
108. E.g., id.; Tom Bullock, Controversial “Justice for All NC” PAC
Returns for Late Push on Judges, WFAE 90.7 (Oct. 30, 2014),
http://www.wfae.org/post/controversial-justice-all-nc-pac-
returns-late-push-judges#stream/0.
years in prison under state law,
Judge Persky sentenced him “to
only six months,” citing his “age,
the fact that both he and the vic-
tim were drunk and that prison
time could have a ‘severe’ impact
on [his] life as the reasoning
behind the lenient six-month
sentence.”97 Persky explained
that Turner also “lost his swim-
ming scholarship to Stanford and
had to register as a sex offender
in Ohio, his home state.”98
Regarding his decision, Judge Persky stated: “As a judge, my
role is to consider both sides. . . . It’s not always popular, but
it’s the law, and I took an oath to follow it without regard to
public opinion or my opinions as a former prosecutor.”99
“Judge Persky was cleared of any official misconduct,” and the
appellate court upheld Turner’s conviction.100 But, “talk of a
recall campaign began almost as soon as he handed down his
sentence. . . . In a statement filed with the county registrar in
response to” campaign efforts against him, led by the victim’s
mother, “Judge Persky said he had a legal and professional
responsibility to consider alternatives to imprisonment for
first-time offenders.”101
The Stanford case caused public outrage for several reasons.
First, the public considered Turner’s sentence, although per-
missible under the law, unreasonably short. More importantly,
many thought that the defendant’s race contributed to the
leniency in sentencing—that he was given a more lenient sen-
tence because he is white rather than black. While this concern
about racial disparities in the justice system is certainly valid,
recalling Persky may have actually undermined the quest for a
more equitable and merciful justice system. As Professor John
Pfaff, an academic who studies criminal justice, explained: “The
recall will make judges more punitive, thwart progress toward
scaling back mass incarceration and—though Turner and Per-
sky are both white—hurt minorities disproportionately.”102
Unlike the attacks in Iowa, Florida, and Tennessee, the
attack against Persky was not driven by special interests seek-
ing to change the composition of the court. Rather, the attack
against Perksy was a result of voters’ outrage caused by one of
Perksy’s sentencing decisions, made in his judicial capacity,
with which voters strongly disagreed because they viewed the
decision as insensitive to and minimizing the serious crime of
sexual assault. However, the message was similar and harmful
to a fair and impartial judiciary nonetheless. The recall of
Judge Persky was still based upon public disapproval of a judi-
cial decision that was valid under the law.
Some may argue that the message sent in the case of Judge
Persky was proper based on the circumstances. But, if the mes-
sage was proper under those circumstances, what is its logical
end point? For state court trial judges who are required to run
in judicial elections, should the judge be able to present a
“tough on crime” platform?103 In fact, many judges may
already feel this pressure. Notably, the Brennan Center
reported in 2017 that multiple studies found that judges sub-
jected to upcoming contested elections or even retention elec-
tions are “more punitive toward defendants in criminal
cases.”104
Kansas offers a useful illustration. Opposition to the 2014
and 2016 merit-retention campaigns of well-qualified Kansas
Supreme Court justices rallied around outrage by the families
of the victims in a decision granting two death row defendants
new sentencing proceedings. While the campaign was started
by the victims’ families, interest groups and the Governor
became involved and ultimately used the decision to create
attack ads accusing the Supreme Court of Kansas of siding
with murderers. As Jim Robinson and I have discussed else-
where, special interest groups and politicians seized on this
case in an attempt to change the composition of the Kansas
Supreme Court, which they considered to be “too liberal.”105
Similarly, the 2014 campaign against Justice Robin Hudson
of the North Carolina Supreme Court, a well-qualified jurist,
launched ads labeling her as “not tough on child molesters”
and, even worse, “not fair.”106 But the real motivation came
from pro-business interests seeking her replacement.107 Fortu-
nately, not only were the attack ads unsuccessful in replacing
Justice Hudson, but both the local and national press became
aware of the motivations behind the campaign and explained
it widely.108 The attacks against Justice Hudson show not only
the harmful messages special interests impose on voters but
also, and more importantly, the importance of educating the
media and public on this topic so they can properly identify
and report on these attacks.
As all of these instances show, the merit-based system for
selecting and retaining judges leaves good judges and justices
vulnerable to attack by special interest groups. Some of these
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of Florida, political influence on the JNC was at the forefront of
discussion. See, e.g., Lloyd Dunkelberger, Ron DeSantis Gets List of
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ORLANDO WEEKLY (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.orlando
weekly.com/Blogs/archives/2018/11/28/ron-desantis-gets-list-of-
conservative-nominees-for-florida-supreme-court-vacancies.
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attacks have even been successful in sending messages to
judges that have no place in the judicial branch, the one
branch of government designed to be free from improper influ-
ence.109 As the Defense Research Institute has stated: “The
unique position of the judiciary stems in part from the long-
standing commitment to the American people to the rule of
law and to constitutional government.”110
POTENTIAL WAYS TO IMPROVE THE MERIT-BASED 
SYSTEM
So, what can we do to ensure that American voters, and the
public at large, understand and evaluate judges based on proper
characteristics—as outlined above—rather than the improper
motivations that have led to former attacks? As Alicia Bannon,
Deputy Director for Program Management of the Brennan Cen-
ter, observed, “there is far more agreement on the problems
associated with judicial elections than on potential reforms.”111
While others may disagree, it seems clear that, while certain
aspects of the system may certainly be improved, a merit-based
system is the preferred method for judicial selection and reten-
tion. Thus, I start with the premise, which may be controversial
among some in the judiciary and legal profession, that election
of state court judges and justices—whether partisan or non-
partisan—always creates the real risk of politicizing the judi-
ciary and subjecting the judiciary to special interest influence.
Both the Brennan Center and The O’Connor Judicial Selection
Plan, as well as other organizations,112 have invested many
resources in determining best practices and creating proposals
for reforming the merit-selection and -retention systems. Having
reviewed the literature and personally experienced these unwel-
come attacks, I agree that, at the least, we should (1) review how
judicial nominating commissions (JNCs) are composed and
instructed, (2) maintain a vigorous judicial qualifications com-
mittee (JQC) process to ensure accountability, (3) consider a
system of judicial evaluations, such as the one in Arizona, pro-
vided it can be truly non-partisan, and last but not least (4) con-
currently provide an effective forum to continue to educate the
public, the media, and voters on
judges up for retention election.
In the end, I am in favor of a
true merit-based system for all
levels of judges with a properly
constituted and nonpartisan
JNC as well as a vigorous JQC to
monitor complaints about judi-
cial conduct. I also believe we
should consider one lengthy
term for judges, without reten-
tion, as the Brennan Center has
proposed.113
1. REVIEWING THE 
COMPOSITION AND INSTRUCTION OF JNCS
First, political influence must be removed (or at least mini-
mized) from every step of the judicial selection and retention
process, beginning with the JNC. Each state’s JNC and JQC is
specifically tasked with ensuring that judges and justices are
properly vetted before selection and that they comply with the
appropriate code of judicial conduct while in office. As former
Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, Ruth V. McGregor,
explained, the JNC “is the key to the judicial merit selection
process.”114 Likewise, the independence of JNCs is critical.
Thus, I agree with the Brennan Center and The O’Connor Judi-
cial Selection Plan that we should rethink how JNCs are com-
posed and instructed.115
For example, in states like Florida, the Governor appoints
each member of the JNC, resulting in the likelihood of a more
partisan commission that, in turn, selects the list of the candi-
dates from which the Governor appoints judges or justices.116
In Vermont, by contrast, the eleven-member JNC is appointed
as follows: three members appointed by the Bar; two members
appointed by the Governor; three members appointed by the
Senate; and three members appointed by the House.117 Ver-
mont’s system seems to diversify the interests at stake better
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actions,123 and two judges were removed by the Supreme Court
of Florida after a JQC action.124
3. JUDICIAL EVALUATIONS
Third, we should consider implementing a system of judicial
evaluation, such as the system used by Arizona and proposed
by The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan. In Arizona, each judge
is evaluated twice during his or her term—“once at midterm
and once at the end of the term just before the general election.
The review is a two-part process.”125 As part of the data collec-
tion and reporting stage, the Judicial Performance Review (JPR)
Commission distributes and collects surveys by “people who
have contact with the judges during a prescribed time period,”
“holds public hearings,” and “accepts written comments from
the public at any time.”126 Then, as part of the self-evaluation
and improvement stage, the “[j]udges complete self-evaluations
to rate their own performance,” using categories identical to
those used in the surveys.127
After compiling the data, the JPR Commission determines
whether the judge “Meets” or “Does Not Meet” the judicial
performance standards, which include whether the judge:
• administer[s] justice fairly, ethically, uniformly, promptly
and efficiently;
• [is] free from personal bias when making decisions and
decide[s] cases based on the proper application of law;
• issue[s] prompt rulings that can be understood and make[s]
decisions that demonstrate competent legal analysis;
• act[s] with dignity, courtesy and patience; and
• effectively manage[s] their courtrooms and the administra-
tive responsibilities of their office.128
Ultimately, the JPR Commission’s findings are made avail-
able to the public.129
Similarly, The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan proposes a
judicial performance evaluation system that would “publically
[sic] disseminate regular evaluations of the performance of
individual judges, based on criteria generally understood to be
characteristics of a good judge.”130 The O’Connor Judicial Selec-
tion Plan defines those criteria as follows:
• Command of relevant substantive law and procedural rules
• Impartiality and freedom from bias
• Clarity of oral and written communications
• Judicial temperament that demonstrates appropriate respect
than systems like Florida’s,
which, in turn, decreases the risk
of politicizing the judiciary.
There are many options. Sys-
tems like Kentucky’s and Indi-
ana’s even involve voters,
although the process is more par-
tisan in Kentucky. There, the JNC
is composed of “the chief justice
of Kentucky (who also serves as
chair), two attorneys elected by
all attorneys in the vacancy’s jurisdiction and four non-attor-
ney Kentucky citizens who are appointed by the governor. The
four citizens must equally represent the two major political
parties.”118
Similarly, Indiana’s seven-member JNC consists of three
attorneys, three non-lawyers, “and the Chief Justice of Indiana
or a Justice of the Supreme Court whom the Chief Justice may
designate.”119 One attorney and one non-attorney are chosen
to represent “each of three geographic districts of the Court of
Appeals.”120 The attorney members “serve three-year stag-
gered terms, after being elected by the attorneys in their
respective districts.121 The Governor appoints the non-attor-
ney members, one from each of the Districts, to serve three-
year terms.”122
Indiana’s JNC-selection process seems to more effectively
reduce political influence, which is critical, by ensuring that
each geographical area is represented, including a combination
of attorneys and non-attorneys, as well as the Chief Justice,
and involving the public. As The O’Connor Judicial Selection
Plan explains, reducing political influence at this stage will
help reduce any political influence that could arise in the next
stage—gubernatorial appointment—as Governors are natu-
rally political actors who are elected by voters to lead the state’s
executive branch.
2. MAINTAINING VIGOROUS JQCS
Second, we must ensure that each state’s JQC remains inde-
pendent and impartial. JQCs are critical in ensuring that
judges are held accountable for violating judicial codes of con-
duct. As the cases of Judges Millan, Mulsey, and Santino illus-
trate, the JQCs are an effective way to ensure accountability
under the judicial codes of conduct. In Florida, for example,
the JQC has caused the removal or resignation of six judges
since 2017—four judges resigned, voluntarily dismissing JQC
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for everyone in the courtroom
• Administrative skills, including competent docket manage-
ment
• Appropriate public outreach131
Implementing plans similar to these would ensure a non-
partisan, objective review of judicial performance, which
would, in turn, provide feedback to judges and, more impor-
tantly, educate voters on the proper criteria by which judges
should be reviewed for retention.
4. PUBLIC EDUCATION
Finally, it is important to create forums for voter education
on judges who appear on the ballot for merit retention. As the
IVP’s purpose indicates and the example from North Carolina
illustrates, voter education is critical. The ABA and IVP have
started this process. In 2005, the ABA appointed a Commission
on Civic Education and the Separation of Powers.132 Also, the
ABA’s Standing Committee on the American Judicial System
states in its mission statement that it “supports efforts to
increase public understanding about the role of the judiciary
and the importance of fair courts within American democ-
racy.”133 More specifically, the Subcommittee on State Courts
“supports efforts to increase public understanding of judicial
selection and retention methods and to increase informed citi-
zen participation in states where judges are subject to election
of any kind.”134
IVP provides educational materials—slide presentations,
handouts, etc.—on their website that can be used for making
presentations to the public, organizing presentations at law
schools and universities, coordinating outreach efforts, and
presenting at bar association events.135 Other organizations
have also recognized the importance of education in the mis-
sion to reduce improper influence on judicial selection and
retention.136 Ultimately, regardless of legislative change, voter
education is critical in ensuring that judges are evaluated
“about procedural fairness, demeanor, and knowledge—not
about particular outcomes in individual cases.”137
CONCLUSION
In creating the judiciary as a separate and co-equal branch
of government, our Founders understood the importance of a
fair and impartial judiciary—one
that does not bend to the will of
the majority, the other two
branches of government, or spe-
cial interests. In the end, state
court judges, without a system
comparable to federal judges’ life-
time appointments (or at least a
defined lengthy term) will always
be vulnerable to removal, or fear
of removal, for rendering
“unpopular” decisions, or those
disapproved by public opinion,
special interests, or the other
political branches.138 Yet state
courts review 95% of all cases in
the United States.139
So how do we as members of the legal profession and judi-
ciary balance accountability with judicial independence? It is
not through campaigns to remove judges who render decisions
with which members of the public, political parties, or special
interests disagree. The primary vehicle for judicial account-
ability—ensuring compliance with codes of judicial conduct
and imposing consequences for misconduct—should be each
state’s judicial qualifications commission. In addition, an inde-
pendent evaluation commission such as the one constituted in
Arizona, if truly nonpartisan, could be charged with periodi-
cally evaluating each judge on the basis of objective, appropri-
ate criteria, such as those explained in this article: integrity,
professional competence, judicial temperament, experience,
and service. 
Further, increasing voter education on judicial elections
and retention, ensuring that judicial nominating commissions
for merit-selection states are appointed to ensure balance and
focus on the merit of the applicants, implementing nonparti-
san, objective evaluations, considering the elimination of
merit-retention elections in favor of one lengthy term, and
ensuring the viability of state judicial qualifications commis-
sions are all proper areas of focus. In the end, a process where
highly qualified attorneys and judges are selected through a
nonpartisan and independent commission, even while the
Governor ultimately selects from that list, is the best way to
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ensure that the public gets what it deserves: a highly qualified
and fair and impartial judiciary.  
I continue to urge that lawyers and judges become actively
involved in defending our judiciary. I also urge the media,
through a free and independent press, to become educated
about these issues so they can effectively inform the public of
the proper considerations when judges are up for retention, as
well as the actual special interests behind the attacks on well-
qualified judges.140 At the same time, it is important to main-
tain ongoing civic education initiatives in schools, colleges,
and for the general public. While I remain concerned about
whether all of these groups, individually or collectively, can
stem the tide—especially from those who would reduce mes-
sages to either a 30-second sound bite or, worse, a 280-charac-
ter Tweet—we have no choice but to put forth our best con-
certed efforts. Nothing less than “justice” and the fundamental
tenets of our Democracy are at stake.141
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The American Judges Association (AJA) conducted interviews about procedural 
fairness with nine national leaders on issues involving judges and the courts. The 
interviews, done by Kansas Court of Appeals Judge and past AJA president Steve
Leben, cover the elements of procedural fairness for courts and judges, how judges
can improve fairness skills, and how the public reacts to courts and judges. The
interviews were done in August 2014; job titles are shown as of the date of the 
interviews.
Visit http://proceduralfairnessguide.org/interviews/ to watch the interviews.
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION:
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS INTERVIEWS
